The
top managers of Jefferson Pilot Financial (JPF) recognized that the
company needed to differentiate itself in the eyes of its customers, the
independent life-insurance advisers who sell and service policies.
Accordingly, in 2000 it instituted a Premier Partners program, which
targeted the several hundred high-performing advisers who were
delivering the lion’s share of JPF’s revenues. The company wanted to
establish itself as the partner of choice for these advisers and
motivate them to drive more and more revenue to JPF. It identified
superior service to them as a key ingredient of that strategy.
To
determine where improved service would have the greatest impact, JPF
undertook an in-depth analysis of the operations of its New Business
unit. The study unearthed considerable variation in the quality of
existing services. For example, processing new policy applications that
required a statement from an attending physician took from one to two
months. The processing times for applications that didn’t require such a
statement were even more variable (they had a standard deviation of
more than 35%), which undermined the value of these policies’ generally
shorter turnarounds. Because of errors, up to 10% of all policy
applications had to be reworked. The problems were not limited to
service quality. There was a significant cost-per-application
differential between JPF’s two primary locations: Greensboro, North
Carolina (the headquarters), and Concord, New Hampshire.
It
was clear that management could significantly increase revenue by
improving operations. Indeed, the company estimated that it could
increase the paid annualized premium for its Premier Partners by 10% to
15% if it could issue all policies within three weeks of receiving the
applications, offer periodic application status reports, simplify the
submission process, and reduce errors to 1%.
For
inspiration, the company’s managers looked to their counterparts in
U.S. manufacturing, who 30 years ago had faced comparable challenges.
Many of the firms that had survived the competitive challenge from
Japanese manufacturers had done so by imitating them. They had adopted
the practices and tools of “lean production,” a term James Womack,
Daniel Jones, and Daniel Roos introduced in their 1990 book, The Machine That Changed the World,
to describe the production system pioneered by Toyota. By using less
space, capital, and labor to make better products that more accurately
met customers’ demands, some U.S. manufacturers were able to double the
productivity of their assets.
JPF
believed that its business could benefit from lean production because
its operations involved the processing of an almost tangible “service
product.” Like an automobile on the assembly line, an insurance policy
goes through a series of processes, from initial application to
underwriting, or risk assessment, to policy issuance. With each step,
value is added to the work in progress—just as a car gets doors or a
coat of paint.
In
late 2000, on the advice of a consulting firm, JPF appointed a
five-person “lean team” to reengineer the New Business operations
according to the principles of lean production. The team included the
assistant vice president of New Business administration and a special
project manager who reported directly to the senior vice president
overseeing New Business operations. They were supported by three
lean-production experts from the consulting firm. Thus the team combined
in-depth knowledge of JPF’s processes with an understanding of
lean-production principles.
The
initiative has delivered impressive results. The company halved the
average time from receipt of a Premier Partner application to issuance
of a policy, reduced labor costs by 26%, and trimmed the rate of
reissues due to errors by 40% (some of these results are summarized in
the exhibit “Setting and Surpassing Goals”). These outcomes contributed
to a remarkable 60% increase in new annualized life premiums in the
company’s core individual-life-insurance business in just two years.
Similar results are being recorded in other departments as the company
rolls out the new systems across the whole organization. In the
following pages, we’ll draw on JPF’s experience to explain what an
effective lean-production system looks like in a service context and how
companies can go about building one.
Setting and Surpassing Goals
Building the Model Cell
The
great advantage of lean-production initiatives like JPF’s over other
types of business process reengineering is that companies can introduce a
lean system without significantly disrupting operations. The key is to
adopt what most lean-production advocates prescribe: the “model cell”
rollout, in which a company sets up, in one area of its business, a
fully functioning microcosm of its entire process. This approach allows
managers to conduct experiments and smooth out the kinks while working
toward an optimal design. It also gets people throughout the
organization excited about the process, paving the way for the broad
transformation effort that will follow.
As
the area for its model cell, JPF chose the section of the New Business
unit devoted to processing policies that came from a specific group of
JPF’s independent advisers, some of them Premier Partners and some of
them not. The unit, which had ten employees and handled policies that
required physician statements and those that didn’t, was large enough to
be representative of the full range of JPF’s New Business operations.
Lean
production is built around the concept of continuous-flow processing—a
departure from traditional production systems, in which large batches
are processed at each step and are passed along only after an entire
batch has been processed. At any given time, most of a batch in a
traditional system is sitting waiting to be processed—in other words, it
is costly excess inventory. And errors cannot be caught or addressed
quickly, because if they occur, they tend to occur on a large scale. In
the model cell, the team was able to create a small-batch flow that
greatly minimized the buildup of work in progress. To redesign the
cell’s work flow, team members applied seven design practices of lean
manufacturing. They made changes in all seven dimensions simultaneously,
and each improvement in each dimension was reinforced by improvements
in others.
Placing Linked Processes Near One Another.
It
is a principle of lean production that all the steps in a process—the
“value stream”—should be located close to one another. Under JPF’s old
system, work groups were located by function. Employees who received
applications and employees who sorted them worked on different floors.
It could take more than a day for a set of files to shuttle from one
group to the other through departmental mail. After the team placed the
application receivers next to the sorters, files were transferred
between the groups in a matter of minutes. There was another benefit,
too. The employees developed a more acute awareness that they were part
of an integrated whole whose purpose was to satisfy the advisers and
policyholders. Once they were no longer toiling in functional silos,
managers and frontline workers were less likely to focus only on the
activities for which they were personally responsible. The old
attitude—“All I’m responsible for is receiving and inputting
applications, and the more I input, the better I perform”—began to fade.
Standardizing Procedures.
JPF
had given employees considerable freedom in managing their work. But by
doing so, the company had made it difficult for other workers to fill
in when there were absences or transfers. For example, most employees
chose their own systems for storing files—some did it by policyholder,
others by policy number, others by date received. When employees were
absent, substitutes sometimes found it hard to figure out where files
were stored, so the process was delayed. The lean team insisted that
files be stored alphabetically and in the same drawer at each
workstation. Similarly, the physical work space for data entry was
standardized so that a supervisor passing by could easily ascertain the
levels of pending and completed applications. Changes of this kind not
only made it much easier for others to help when workloads were high or
workers were absent, they also improved the performance of the employees
primarily responsible for each job.
Eliminating Loop-Backs.
A
loop-back, in which work returns to a previous step for further
processing, typically creates delays. In a manufacturing setting, if a
machine in a stamping process is used in a subsequent step as well, two
flows of work feed into the machine at once, limiting the speed of the
overall process and causing inventory to build up in front of the
machine. When the process involves humans, not machines, the situation
may be further complicated by the employees’ choices concerning which
tasks to do when. At JPF, the lean team noticed that under the existing
system, all the sections of each policy form were sent back to the
employee who had received the initial application so that he or she
could physically assemble the policy and send it to the adviser. It was
possible that employees would spend extra time assembling policies,
leaving teams idle downstream and delaying the flow of application
processing. JPF split the receiving team in half, assigning some of the
employees to assemble the policies while the rest continued to receive
applications. The change required no additional space, equipment, or
people, but it eliminated confusion on the part of employees about what
they should be doing when, and it substantially reduced delays and
waste.
Setting a Common Tempo.
The
team further smoothed out work flow by applying the concept of “takt”
time. Takt, the heartbeat of lean operations, is derived from the German
word for musical meter. It refers to pacing work according to customer
demand. The team knew that to satisfy demand, New Business needed to
process ten applications per hour; the takt time was therefore one
application every six minutes. A worker producing at a slower rate would
leave the next person in line temporarily idle and would ultimately
prevent the group from meeting customer demand. The lean-team members
timed each work element of the model cell, such as retrieving an
application from an in box and performing the keystrokes required to get
an application into the system. They established a baseline time for
each element by determining how quickly an untrained person could do it,
then challenged employees to make improvements and create shorter
baseline times. As workers found ways to cut unnecessary tasks, the lean
team determined the minimum number of employees required for completion
of all steps.
Balancing Loads.
Lean
production systems are designed to balance work evenly among employees.
Although workers appreciate the fairness of this practice, its greater
value is that it eliminates unnecessary delays. JPF had always allocated
incoming applications first by distribution channel and then
alphabetically at each stage. An application from a customer named Burns
would be allocated to the A–C team even if another team was idle. In
the model cell, the alphabetical method was replaced by sequential
allocation, so that every team received the same number of applications.
This enabled work to flow smoothly from one fully utilized employee to
the next without unnecessary delays.
Segregating Complexity.
Anyone
who has stood in line at a bank while a single teller assisted a
customer with a lengthy transaction understands this principle. The key
to successfully segregating complexity is to cluster tasks of similar
levels of difficulty into separate groups with their own performance
goals. Thus the model cell eventually divided into two groups, one
handling cases that did not require a physician statement and the other
handling those that did. Once the separation was made, the turnaround
time for cases not needing a doctor’s statement fell by more than 80%.
Posting Performance Results.
Following
one of lean manufacturing’s best practices, JPF displayed the cell’s
hourly productivity rates along with the company’s expectations. The
numbers were posted on large white boards so that all employees could
see when and where—and therefore why—performance was suffering. The team
also set aside an area by the boards so that employees could meet
quickly to discuss ways of solving performance problems that arose. Not
surprisingly, the boards made a few people uneasy. Some workers feared
that the posted results would be used to assign blame and punish low
performers. But as employees grew accustomed to the ubiquitous boards,
the displays became rallying points for celebrating successes and
encouraging the team to set new performance records. Employees
understood that they would be evaluated on and rewarded for objective
results they could track themselves—rather than by their bosses’
subjective observations.
Setting Performance Goals
To
implement lean production, a company typically must overhaul the way it
measures costs, speed, and quality. Indeed, managers often find that
many of their company’s favorite metrics actually inhibit productivity.
For example, if the performance of call-center reps is measured by the
length of an average phone call, the center may get a lot of repeat
calls because customers’ concerns are not being resolved the first time.
To get around this kind of problem, practitioners of lean production
follow an important principle: They always measure performance and
productivity from the customer’s perspective. For a call center,
managers will usually measure the percentage of customers whose issues
are addressed in a single call.
Among
the metrics JPF found it needed to change was processing time. The
company had traditionally measured the time from when an application
arrived at the new-business processing center to when the approved
policy was printed and bound. JPF switched to measuring the gap between
when the application is mailed to the company and when the adviser
receives a completed policy, which is how its customers assess the
company’s speed. Customer-focused metrics of this kind helped erode the
“My work is all that matters” mind-set of JPF’s employees.
Another
important principle of lean production is that shop-floor goals should
be linked to the metrics that are applied to the CEO’s performance.
Toyota calls this hoshin kanri,
or policy deployment, and it is the best way to align an organization’s
activities with its strategic objectives. At JPF, the metric for the
CEO’s performance is the ratio of the company’s total acquisition
expenses to the value of new paid premiums. The cell’s productivity
directly affects this measure—as productivity increases, the acquisition
expense eventually decreases. An employee inputting applications is
evaluated by the number of applications he or she inputs per hour, and
the input team’s manager is assessed on the hourly number of
applications the team inputs. The input manager’s boss, the New Business
assistant vice president, is assessed according to the productivity of
the input team and all the other steps in the process. These
productivity rates affect the metric for the VP in charge of New
Business, a measure that is the same as the performance metric for the
CEO. Thus, the CEO’s success is directly linked to each frontline
worker’s productivity. In this way, JPF has spread accountability and
rewards throughout the system, rather than concentrating them at the
top.
Companies
like JPF whose production systems rely heavily on third-party vendors
also need to look at their suppliers through a lean-production lens.
What JPF found prompted it to establish new vendor-selection criteria
such as alignment with Jefferson Pilot objectives, aggressive annual
goal-setting, and the adoption of lean processes that fit well with
JPF’s. It replaced one of its vendors with a company that not only
provided faster turnaround times at a lower cost but also was willing to
commit to ongoing performance improvements.
JPF
was luckier than some companies: Most of its existing frontline metrics
matched lean-production requirements fairly well, and for those
metrics, the team immediately established short-term (three-month) and
long-term (12-month) goals. In areas where metrics needed adjustment,
such as productivity by job function and certain customer-satisfaction
scores, the lean team collected four weeks’ worth of data in the new
cell and established baselines from which cell managers could set goals
for the new processes. Toward the end of the model cell’s first quarter,
after the new suppliers had been integrated into the system, the lean
team drew on the experience of the first few months to establish more
aggressive second-quarter goals. The table “Posting Results for All to
See” lists some of the cell’s principal frontline metrics, which were
displayed on the white boards.
Posting Results for All to See
Rolling Out the New System
Buoyed
by its successes, the lean team proposed a six-month rollout of lean
production to the rest of New Business operations. The company undertook
the essential work of documenting the procedures and standard
operations that were by now in place at the model cell so that they
could be transferred to the new work cells that would be set up in
Greensboro and Concord. It then disbanded the model cell. Once the
Greensboro and Concord facilities’ floor plans and telephone systems
were adjusted to accommodate the changes and files had been moved, the
transformation went live at both locations.
JPF
divided operations according to the status of the customers and the
complexity of the tasks. At each site there were now three cells: two
handling applications that required physicians’ statements (one for
Premier Partner customers, the other for all the rest), and a “fast
track” cell handling all applications that didn’t require doctors’
statements. The company changed its formal structure, which had
previously been based on function and adviser type, to reflect the new
system, in which employees were organized by cell.
The
lean team also identified other JPF operations that could benefit from
the new system, based on each operation’s significance to advisers, the
magnitude of the new system’s impact, and the unit’s strategic
importance. The Exchanges and Conversions unit, for example, became an
early target because its processes resembled those of New Business and,
like New Business, the unit was a source of frustration for many
advisers. Eventually, the Exchanges and Conversions unit was rolled into
the existing New Business cells at the two sites. All in all, the
rollout to other operations took approximately 18 months.
The
application of lean principles throughout JPF is not only delivering
direct productivity gains, it is also helping the firm make more
cost-effective capital investments. For instance, all proposals for
automating processes now include a lean analysis of operations, and JPF
will not introduce automation in an area until lean principles have been
applied and the new process has stabilized. When the company was
considering the introduction of an automated work-flow-distribution
system to Customer Service, the lean team first segregated the complex
tasks. In this way, JPF ensured that the technology would add to
productivity rather than simply pave the cow path.
Convincing the Skeptics
As
the rollout progressed, the lean team worked with each business area to
apply the principles of lean production. The team realized that to
ensure effective knowledge transfer to operational management and
frontline employees, it needed to communicate the “why” of lean as well
as the “how.” Everyone in the company needed to understand why the new
process design was necessary and that it would require continual
adjustment as the business environment changed and additional
improvements were sought.
One
standard device the team found especially successful in communicating
the why and how of lean production was the airplane game. In this
decidedly low-tech exercise, teams build paper airplanes to made-up
customer specifications. The winner is the team with the highest profit
as measured by output minus work in progress and defects. In a series of
rounds, teams typically find themselves moving from batch production to
a continuous-flow process. Prior to the start of the final round, the
team is permitted to redesign the construction process from the ground
up and is encouraged to incorporate suggestions for improvement from all
team members. (For a more detailed description of this exercise, see
the exhibit “The Airplane Game.”)
In
just a few hours, the game drives home lean production’s basic
principles. These take-aways are then leveraged in the workplace as
people begin questioning aspects of their jobs. “How is profitability
measured in my department?” “Who uses my work once I’m done, and what do
they do with it?” “How close do I sit to the rest of my process team?”
“Is my neighbor idle while I am scrambling to keep up the pace?” “Does
work come in batches that allow a single step to become a bottleneck, or
does the work move forward one piece at a time?” “Are we waiting until
the end of the process to check for errors, or are we inspecting at
every point in the process?” “Are there steps that can be eliminated,
and am I pushing management to implement changes?” Questions like these
establish a foundation for much deeper and more far-reaching changes
down the line.
Despite
its best efforts, the team did encounter some resistance. Managers of
various functional areas were especially skeptical. How could they be
sure this new approach wasn’t just a disruptive flavor-of-the-month
initiative that would quickly come and go? But as the rollout advanced,
performance improvements converted skeptics into true believers. JPF’s
managers saw that the aggressive goals were achievable. Staff members
realized they were capable of performing more cross-functional work
within the cell environment, and they were won over by the white boards
that gave their contributions unprecedented visibility. They also liked
the regular meetings with area management (daily at first, then less
often as problems dwindled), which ensured they had a voice in the
change process. Indeed, line leaders were the source of a number of
important changes, such as modifications to the work allocation among
administrators. The visible participation of senior leadership (the head
of operations periodically walked through the areas where the new
process was in place, and the vice presidents actively participated in
the redesign) also emphasized the importance of the project.• • •
Although
lean production is usually seen as a manufacturing concept, many of its
tools were developed in the service industries. Take the concept of the
supermarket. In its lean-production sense, a supermarket is a storage
area where line managers can “shop” for their required materials and
components. It was a big departure from the way mass-production
manufacturers had ordered and distributed materials 40 years ago, when
material was essentially pushed through the production process and
people at each step focused purely on their own output measures. But of
course the materials supermarket was based on an old concept in a
service industry, namely retailing: Customers pulled what they wanted
from the shelves, which were then replenished for subsequent customers.
In many respects, therefore, companies like JPF are only bringing the
principles of lean production back home.
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